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Introduction
A thorough review of space warfare and space weaponization literature reveals that technologist or political/social scientists are the principal authors. These documents are wellresearched and provide a broad background of information on a complex topic. What the literature is missing, however, is a discussion of what space-based weapons in general could accomplish for the combatant commander. Most papers try to define schools of thought on why space should or should not be weaponized. A large volume of papers discuss the attributes of particular technologies and why they should or should not be developed into space-based capabilities. The problem with these schools of thought or technology papers is they tend to neglect the advantages that space provides to combatant commanders.
The purpose of this paper is not to advocate space weaponization. Rather it is to advocate for a proper advocate. Technologists unquestionably have the ability to develop a better mouse trap. Policy gurus argue eloquently for or against a given proposal based on the security environment. The individual services understand warfare, but they tend to translate requirements into service specific capabilities. What space weaponization needs is an advocate who can speak to what he would expect a space-based weapon to do for him in light of his mission requirements. We do not need more papers about weapons looking for a mission. We need position papers and integrated priority lists defining missions in need of a weapon. If that mission can be force multiplied with the advantages the space environment can provide, then we may have a justifiable space capability that can be developed to meet war fighting needs in both peace and war.
The thesis of this paper is that technologist peddling their wares, political strategies advocating arms control regimes (for and against), and the services either overselling or ignoring space capabilities are the wrong communities to advocate space weaponization (or space sanctuary). Their positions, while useful from an academic or service specific point of view, do not focus on the combatant command prospects for military mission accomplishment. Those responsible for military mission accomplishment, the combatant commanders, should be the primary advocate for, or at least have the last word on space weaponization. This paper will review space weaponization from a business model perspective and prospects for space advocacy within that model. It will assess what capabilities and limitations space systems can offer from a power projection perspective. It will discuss the current state of policy and the nature of space warfare and attempt to identify why, from an historical military innovation perspective, combatant commanders may be best positioned to advocate the development of space weapons if they should be developed at all.
In addition, this paper will avoid taking a position on space weaponization per se and thus cannot be characterized within one of the many schools of thought proposed by Professor Karl Mueller's typology.
1 However, it does assume that from a warfighting perspective space capabilities should be pursued if one believes either that because space weaponization is inevitable, the United States should be first (the "space racer" school) and/or that the military utility of space is so great that the benefits to the United States of weaponization either outweighs the cost or should be included in the trade space of alternatives for power projection (the "space controller" school). This paper does not assume that space, as the ultimate high ground, ought to be weaponized at any cost (the "space hegemonist" school). 
Space Capabilities and Limitations
Over the past decade much debate has occurred and much has been written advocating or arguing for or against the development of space weapons. A recent study by RAND Corporation identifies four arguments that might justify the development of space weapons. The first three justifications relate to some threat or some cooperative effort with an allied nation. I would characterize them as "wait and see" justification. I think that these arguments, while valid, may not provide capability on the most important basis: a need to meet existing and/or emerging regional threat that directly respond to warfighting requirements. The fourth justification: "unilaterally undertaking the acquisition of space weapons … to demonstrate global leadership, to protect U.S. and allied economic investments, or to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of military capability," 9 is the only one of the four that captures the proper rationale for U.S. development of any new weapons systems. Space-based weapons like any new weapon should be based on warfighting requirements or parameters articulated by combatant commanders in their integrated priority lists. These requirements should be based on mission capabilities needed rather than advocacy for a particular system in the acquisition cycle. Mission requirements for which space systems have the requisite attributes should be migrated to space system research and development and/or acquisition.
Fundamentally, space systems have certain attributes. "For military purposes, space offers an unmatched vantage point for observation of potentially hostile activity anywhere in the world." 10 The vantage point is in a location that is politically neutral and relatively unlimited in potential for power projection as well. As such, "space also offers a deployment area for stationing weapons for use both against in-space targets and against surface targets." 11 In addition, space systems have an inherent presence that can be exploited in military terms through near instantaneous response (depending on the number and orbital location of the weapon) during periods of peace and conflict. Once on orbit, satellites can operate for extended periods and cover the entire surface of the earth (though coverage may not be continuous, the duration of coverage can be preprogrammed prior to launch). As a result, unlike other forces, space forces can provide undeniable access and freedom of action (see vulnerabilities) during periods of both peace and conflict. Like the Navy, space offers direct access to targets from neutral territory and like airpower it exploits the vertical dimension … space offers the best of what sea and air power offer in a single package.
Space does have several limitations, however. Space systems are designed and built to be lightweight. As a result their supporting structures are vulnerable to kinetic and directed energy attack. In addition, orbitology is a highly predictable phenomenon. Once a space system is launched, it can be tracked and its location can be determined at any given time. This limitation assumes that some method of disguising either the mission or location, if possible, has not been employed. Given the fragility and predictability of space systems, it would seem to me that a lucrative research and technology area would be investments that seek to disguise the signatures and missions of space systems. Finally, cost drivers are a major factor in times of limited budgets and in times of crises for which space-based weapons appear to have limited utility -third world and/or non-state adversaries. However, we cannot focus solely on this lowest common denominator foe. 
Current Space Policy
A common misconception among warfighters is that space-based weapons violate a number of treaties to which the United States is a signatory. This is simply not the case.
Granted, "some space-based weapons are explicitly prohibited by treaty: weapons of mass 
Nature of Space Warfare
Air and space systems operate in fundamentally different ways. Both "exploit the vertical dimension." This argument has been made by the Air Force to justify its position as the space steward. However, the operations and the protection of space assets have greater similarity to the maritime environment: they operate in neutral territory and their protection is similar to the protection of commercial shipping from both an operation (frequency protection) and freedom of movement (orbital location) aspect. Protecting space system from mechanical and electronic interference is similar to the Navy's mission of protecting sea lanes.
Upon reading Julian Corbett's noted work, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, the parallels between the nature of sea power and space power are evident. According to Corbett, outside territorial waters the sea is not susceptible to ownership. 16 The same can be said about space beyond altitudes that permit controlled flight. Space, like the open sea, is neutral territory. Space is also a medium that requires defense and protection of chokepoints (orbits) and lines of communication (electronic uplinks and downlinks). It is an area of important national commercial interests related directly to the economic, and in the cases of space in particular, informational wellbeing of the state during periods of both peace and war.
Therefore, unlike armies and air forces, space forces, like naval forces are required to defend our interests even in times of peace.
The Navy's Sea Power 21 plan has a number of areas of emphasis for the future that might be met with space capabilities rather than naval force structure developments. The Navy defines its sea strike concept as providing "true time-sensitive strike -i. Though access to space can be limited by an adversary with appropriate countermeasures, so to can access to the sea be limited or prevented. The limiting factor for navies that is not shared by space forces is that, at least under current operational parameter, space systems are unmanned while naval systems present the potential for significant loss of life in addition to the cost of the hardware should they be effectively attacked. Therefore I agree with the Navy's position:
The ultimate source of peacetime persuasive power lies in the implied guarantee that both the intent and capability to protect our national interests are present just over the horizon, with the fortitude and staying power to sustain operations as long as necessary.
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However, I might argue that the better guarantor of our nation's "intent and capability to protect" may be space rather than naval forces.
While the Navy may be unintentionally arguing in favor of capabilities that may be better met through space systems, the Air Forces' efforts to justify its stewardship of space Also, while similarities between space operations and naval operations may argue in favor of naval control of space missions, they may also support arguments for the reduction of naval assets in lieu of greater funding for space weaponization. If space weapons can impose our national policies on an adversary without the corresponding risk to American lives, perhaps policy makers will consider them a more viable alternative to naval capabilities. In fact, as discussed earlier, the Navy's proposed future capabilities may present the Air Force or some other space advocate with fodder to justify the development of space weapons. The Navy might want to be careful what it asks for or at least how it describes the attributes of the systems it needs.
Since space systems or at least the defense of commercial space interests is a requirement in both peacetime and wartime, dual purpose space-based weapons (weapons that can attack both space-based and terrestrial targets) could considered for a possible role in deterrence. These systems could provide U.S. decision makers and combatant commanders with power projection option during periods of peace and war. Since the potential for multi-mission, universally present power projection is at least possible with space-based weapons, one could ask why such innovations have not been pursued. The answer might be found in the nature of military innovation and change itself.
Military Innovation
If The process of innovation is complex. How and why innovation might occur is not easy to assess or predict. In the case of space weaponization, we are talking about a major Rosen, 51. mission rather than combatant commander mission requirements looking for a weapon. As a result the weapons fall short, and Dr DeBlois' position is supported. The most bothersome parts of his argument for me were his assertions that we can already win terrestrial conflicts without space weapons and that even though space weapons have the ability to reduce response timelines, the limited ability of man to rationalize a complex international situation will preclude our ability to employ a weapon with these inherent advantages. 31 The problem with this argument is that it emphasized the status quo. The Unites States is a world superpower because it maintains a qualitative edge over potential adversaries. I have the sense that if Dr. DeBlois was alive a century ago, he would have argued against military aircraft development because we already had balloons for observation and artillery and battleship firepower had sufficient range to meet our military needs on land and sea.
It is from within this "noisy" environment, that combatant commanders must present a voice of reason and directness. They must wade through service-level parochialism, technologist peddling their wares, and policy wonks espousing the status quo for the benefit of mankind. Combatant Commanders are the best hope for space weaponization should they believe that such capabilities will enhance their mission accomplishment. If space weaponization has nothing to offer, then the combatant commander is the one to convince.
5. Overall, the United States should not limit itself in terms of weapons development for fear of being the first to develop a capability. Space is a place not a mission. If we can exploit it to our economic advantage, we should not be afraid to exploit for its military advantages, if any, as well.
